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Ranked ordering sources and embedded modality 
Drew Reisinger* 
Abstract. I present an ordering semantics for modality in which possible worlds are 
ordered by ordering sources augmented with a partial order structure. This extension 
of Kratzer’s (1991) ordering semantics allows propositions to contribute to the ideal 
defined by an ordering source with differing degrees of priority and allows this 
priority relation to vary with the world of evaluation. Although the * operator of 
Katz et al. (2012) also allows ordering sources to be combined with different degrees 
of priority, I show that it does not account for a variant of Goble’s (1996) Medicine 
Problem in which a modal is embedded under an attitude verb. I also extend the 
investigation by Katz et al. (2012) into the combinatorial structure of complex 
ordering sources by proposing a generalization of their * operator for partially 
ordered ordering sources. 
Keywords. modality; semantics; ordering semantics; intensional semantics; formal 
semantics; discourse context 
1. Introduction. In this paper, I present the Embedded Medicine Problem, an extension of
Goble’s (1996) Medicine Problem in deontic logic that demonstrates the need for ordering 
source priorities that can be shifted by intensional operators. I show how ordering sources aug-
mented with a partial order structure, which I will call ranked ordering sources, meet this need, 
and I present a mechanism by which ranked ordering sources induce orderings on possible 
worlds. 
This paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I review some of the relevant work on mo-
dality and ordering semantics, focusing particularly on the mechanism of Katz et al. (2012) for 
combining ordering sources with differing degrees of priority and how it solves Goble’s (1996) 
Medicine Problem. In section 3, I introduce the Embedded Medicine Problem and show that it 
presents difficulties for the Katz et al. (2012) account. In section 4, I describe the formal machin-
ery of ranked ordering sources and show how my proposal addresses the difficulties raised by the 
Embedded Medicine Problem. In section 5, I relate ranked ordering sources to the research pro-
gram introduced by Katz et al. (2012) of investigating mechanisms for constructing complex 
ordering sources from simpler ones, and I define a combinatorial operator on ordering sources, 
the priority join, that generalizes the * operator from Katz et al. (2012). Finally, in section 6, I 
conclude by speculating on the application of ranked ordering sources to various linguistic phe-
nomena addressed by the modality literature. 
2. Background. In this section, I first briefly review Kratzer’s (1991) now standard doubly rela-
tive semantics for modality. I then present Goble’s (1996) Medicine Problem, which challenges 
the standard approach. Finally, I describe the mechanism proposed byKatz et al. (2012) for com-
bining ordering sources with different degrees of priority and show how it solves the Medicine 
Problem. 
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2.1. DOUBLY RELATIVE MODALITY. The standard doubly relative account of modality has its roots 
in Kratzer (1977), which introduces conversational backgrounds as a contextual parameter of 
modals, and is developed further in Kratzer (1981), which introduces ordering sources, but this 
paper will use the version found in Kratzer (1991). The denotations of possibility modals, here 
exemplified by can, and necessity modals, exemplified by should, are reproduced1 in (1). 
(1) a.  
b.  
The two denotations differ only in the quantifier over possible worlds. Both take a proposition p 
as their argument, and both depend on two contextual parameters, f and g, which are so-called 
conversational backgrounds, functions that map each possible world to a set of propositions. The 
conversational background f is called the modal base, and intuitively, f(w) is a set of propositions 
representing the content of some information state or body of evidence. For example, the propo-
sitions in f(w) might be the beliefs of the speaker in w or the mutual beliefs of the speaker and 
listener in w. The conversational background g is called the ordering source. Intuitively, the 
propositions in g(w) characterize some kind of ideal in w. For example, a deontic ordering source 
maps w to a set of moral edicts or laws that hold in w, a teleological ordering source maps w to a 
set of goals of some agent in w, and a stereotypical ordering source maps w to a set of proposi-
tions characterizing what typically (but not always) happens in w (see Kratzer 1981:45 for a 
more detailed discussion of different ordering source types). Thus, [[can]]w,f,g(p) is true if and 
only if among the worlds consistent with some body of information f(w) that best conform to the 
ideal defined by g(w), there is at least one world in which p is true. Similarly, [[should]]w,f,g(p) is 
true if and only if p is true in all of the g(w)-best worlds consistent with f(w). 
Formally, the notion of conforming to the ideal characterized by g(w) is modeled by the pre-
ordering denoted ≤g(w) and defined as in (2). 
(2)  
That is, the world v is at least as good as the world u with respect to g(w) if and only if every 
proposition in g(w) satisfied by u is also satisfied by v. The max operator in (1) picks out the 
maximal worlds in ∩f(w) according to the ordering ≤g(w). 
2.2. COMBINED ORDERING SOURCES AND THE MEDICINE PROBLEM. Although the account in the 
previous section is standardly used in the modality literature, it has been challenged on several 
fronts. One such challenge comes from Goble’s (1996) Medicine Problem, which was originally 
proposed as a problem for deontic logics but was adapted and simplified by Lassiter (2011) to 
argue against quantificational modal semantics. 
The Medicine Problem scenario, in Lassiter’s (2011) simplified form, is as follows. A pa-
tient is deathly ill, and a doctor must choose which of two medicines, A and B, to administer to 
the patient and cannot choose both. Medicine A is risky, as although it will completely cure the 
patient with low probability, it has a high probability of killing the patient. On the other hand, 
medicine B will always leave the patient alive and cure the disease, but its side effects will leave 
the patient somewhat debilitated. Given this scenario, many (including Goble 1996, Lassiter 
1 The denotations used here differ from Kratzer’s (1991) in two respects. First, unlike Kratzer, I assume that there
are maximal worlds in the ordering induced by g(w) and hence use the max operator. Second, I use the notation  
u ≤g(w) v to mean that v is at least as good a world as u with respect to g(w), whereas the notation is reversed in 
Kratzer (1991) and many subsequent papers. 
JcanKw,f,g =  phs,ti . 9w0 2 maxg(w) [T f(w)] : p(w0)JshouldKw,f,g =  phs,ti . 8w0 2 maxg(w) [T f(w)] : p(w0)
u g(w) v i↵ {p 2 g(w) | p(u)} ✓ {p 2 g(w) | p(v)}
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2011, and Katz et al. 2012) have the intuition that (3) is, or at least can be, true, as medicine B is 
less risky. 
(3) The doctor should administer medicine B. 
However, the standard account predicts unambiguously that the doctor should administer medi-
cine A because the best worlds under an ordering source that values the eventual health of the 
patient are those improbable worlds in which the patient takes medicine A and survives, even 
though the worlds in which the patient takes medicine A and dies are worse than those in which 
medicine B is administered. 
Katz et al. (2012), in agreement with Lassiter (2011), attributes the failure of the standard 
account in this case to its inability to model both the desirability and likelihood of outcomes with 
a single ordering source. However, contra Lassiter (2011), who argues for a probabilistic analy-
sis of the modal operator, Katz et al. (2012) solve the Medicine Problem while preserving 
Kratzer’s (1991) quantificational modal semantics by changing the ordering source in a system-
atic way. In particular, given an ordering source g1 that orders worlds by their likelihood and an 
ordering source g2 that orders them by their desirability, they construct a new ordering source  
g1 * g2 using the operator defined in (4). 
(4)  
The * operator takes two ordering sources g1 and g2 as input and produces a new ordering source 
that, when combined with Kratzer’s (1991) definition of ≤g(w), first orders worlds according to g1 
and then breaks any remaining ties according to g2 (see Katz et al. 2012:497 for intuitions about 
why this definition works). In other words, g1 * g2 is an ordering source that prioritizes g1 over 
g2. In the Medicine Problem scenario, if likelihood is prioritized over desirability, then the most 
desirable possible worlds after first restricting to the most likely worlds are indeed the worlds in 
which the patient takes medicine B. Even though the worlds in which they take A and survive are 
more desirable, they are not among the most likely worlds. 
One advantage of this solution is that it accounts for the intuition that the truth value of (3) is 
subjective depending on the speaker’s priorities. If the speaker indeed prioritizes likelihood over 
desirability, and hence uses the ordering source g1 * g2, they judge (3) to be true, but if they pri-
oritize desirability over likelihood, and hence use g2 * g1, they judge it to be false. The formal 
machinery of Katz et al. (2012) indeed correctly predicts this dependence of the truth value on 
subjective priority. Nevertheless, it is precisely this dependence on subjective priority that moti-
vates the puzzle I present in the next section. 
3. The Embedded Medicine Problem. In this section, I propose the Embedded Medicine Prob-
lem (EMP), a slight extension of Lassiter’s (2011) version of the original Medicine Problem that 
challenges the Katz et al. (2012) implementation of ordering source priority. As noted in the pre-
vious section, the truth value of (3), reproduced below as (5), depends on the speaker’s 
subjective priority ranking between the likelihood and desirability ordering sources. Because of 
this subjectivity, sentence (6) can reasonably be uttered in a scenario in which the speaker and 
Kat disagree about how the two ordering sources should be ranked. 
(5) The doctor should administer medicine B. 
(6) The doctor should administer medicine B, but Kat thinks they should administer A. 
(g1 ⇤ g2)(w) = g1(w) [
[
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In fact, the disagreement in (6) can reasonably occur even if Kat and the speaker agree on both of 
the following pieces of contextual information: What the effects of the two different medicines 
could be and that the doctor cannot administer both medicines (the modal base), which outcomes 
are most desirable (the ordering source g2), and how likely each outcome is given a choice of 
medicine (the ordering source g1). That is, (6) is true in a scenario where the speaker’s beliefs 
and Kat’s beliefs differ minimally in the subjective degrees of priority assigned to the two rele-
vant ordering sources. 
Nevertheless, Katz et al.’s (2012) account predicts that (6) is false in the scenario described. 
In fact, if Kat and the speaker agree on the modal base and the ordering sources g1 and g2, it pre-
dicts that (6) is a contradiction. Formally, for Kat and the speaker to agree on the modal base 
means that in any world w consistent with Kat’s beliefs, f(w) = f(w@), where w@ is the world of 
evaluation supplied by the speaker’s context of utterance. If they agree on both of the ordering 
sources, then the same condition holds replacing f with g1 and g2. Now if the ordering source 
used to interpret (6) is any function of g1 and g2, for example g1 * g2 or g2 * g1, then that ordering 
source will also be the same in w@ and in Kat’s belief worlds. Thus, both occurrences of should 
in (6) quantify over the same set of possible worlds, . But then the first con-
junct of (6) implies that every world in this set is one in which the doctor administers medicine 
B, and the second conjunct implies that in every world in this set, the doctor administers A. Since 
the modal base eliminates worlds in which the doctor administers both medicines, the two con-
juncts of (6) are predicted to be inconsistent, contrary to the intuitions in the previous paragraph. 
Intuitively, Katz et al.’s (2012) account could accommodate the EMP if the modal in the 
first conjunct could be interpreted with respect to g1 * g2, and the second modal could be inter-
preted with respect to g2 * g1. However, the machinery of this account provides no way to shift 
the ordering source in the embedded context. Rather, Katz et al. (2012) envisions the * operator 
as a way of deriving the ordering source required to interpret an utterance from more intuitive 
ordering sources, such as simple likelihood and desirability ordering sources, that are accessible 
in context. In the next section, I rectify this limitation of this formalism by moving ordering 
source priority into the core semantics of modality. 
4. Ranked ordering sources. In this section, I first describe the primary formal contribution of 
this paper, ranked ordering sources. I then use this formalism to address the difficulties raised by 
the EMP. Afterward, I introduce notation based on Optimality Theory to facilitate manual com-
putation with ranked ordering sources. 
4.1. INTRODUCING PARTIAL ORDERS. As described previously, ordering sources as proposed by 
Kratzer (1981) are functions from possible worlds to sets of propositions, and these propositions 
determine an ordering on worlds. In particular, all of the propositions in the ordering source are 
weighted equally in constructing the order on worlds. 
The following slightly modified example from Katz et al. (2012) illustrates this property and 
shows why it may be undesirable. If g is an ordering source representing the laws of some juris-
diction in a given possible world, then in the actual world, g(w@) would probably include {λw . 
There is no murder in w,  λw . There is no jaywalking in w}. The ordering on possible worlds 
induced by this ordering source is represented in the Hasse diagram in Figure 1, in which worlds 
toward the top of the diagram are ordered above those toward the bottom of the diagram. 
maxg(w@) [
T
f(w@)]
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Figure 1. The ordering on worlds induced by the flat ordering source g(w@) = {¬M, ¬J}, where 
M and J denote the propositions that there is murder and jaywalking, respectively, in w. 
According to this order, the best worlds are those in which neither of the crimes occur, and the 
worst are those in which both crimes occur. However, the worlds in which only one of the crimes 
occurs are no better or worse than the other. This ordering source disprefers murder just as much 
as it does jaywalking, contrary to intuitions. Ideally, the ordering source should be able to repre-
sent both that murder and jaywalking violate the law and that murder is a worse violation than 
jaywalking. Like Katz et al. (2012), I argue that examples like this and the Medicine Problem 
motivate formal models of ordering source priorities, but rather than implementing such priori-
ties with a contextual operator on ordering sources, I propose to encode priorities explicitly in the 
ordering sources themselves. 
 Formally, a ranked ordering source is a function from possible worlds to partially ordered 
sets of propositions. That is, a ranked ordering source not only contains propositions that define 
some ideal but also an irreflexive and transitive relation ≺ on those propositions that ranks them 
by their weight in contributing to the ideal.2 I will use the notation g, ≺ to denote a ranked order-
ing source and g(w), ≺w to denote a ranked ordering source evaluated at a particular world. In the 
crime example above, an intuitive choice of ranked ordering source would be g(w) = {¬M, ¬J} 
such that ¬J ≺w	¬M. That is, not murdering is more important to the ideal than not jaywalking. 
Although the addition of partial order structure to ordering sources does intuitively capture 
how different propositions in the ordering source can have different weights, I have not yet spec-
ified how a partially ordered set, or poset, of propositions induces an ordering on possible 
worlds. First, I will develop the intuition for my definition. According to Kratzer’s (1991) order-
ing, v is at least as good as u with respect to an unranked ordering source g(w) if every 
proposition in g(w) satisfied at u is also satisfied at v. Equivalently, v is at least as good as u if 
every proposition in g(w) that is not satisfied at v is also not satisfied at u. Thus, testing whether 
v is at least as good as u can be thought of in terms of the violations by v of the ideal: If v has any 
violations that u does not, then v is not at least as good as u. In the crime example, if v is a world 
with jaywalking and no murder, and u is a world with murder and no jaywalking, then v is not 
better than u because it has a violation, namely jaywalking, that u does not. 
However, intuition suggests that v’s violation of the ideal is forgivable relative to u because 
u has an even worse violation. This motivates a new test for whether v is better than u: If v has 
any violations that u does not, and those violations are not overshadowed by an even worse vio-
lation of u’s, then v is not at least as good as u. This test is formalized in (7), where Vg(w)(u) (read 
“u’s violations in g(w)”) denotes the subset {p ∈ g(w) | ¬p(u)} of propositions in g(w) that are 
false at the possible world u. 
(7)  
                                                
2 Throughout the paper, I will use the straight ordering symbol < to denote orderings on possible worlds and the 
curved ordering symbol ≺ to denote orderings on ordering source propositions. 
¬M,¬J
M,¬J ¬M,J
M, J
u g(w), w v i↵ 8p 2 Vg(w)(v)  Vg(w)(u) :
 9q 2 Vg(w)(u)  Vg(w)(v) s.t. p  w q 
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That is, v is at least as good as u with respect to a poset of propositions g(w), ≺w if and only if for 
every one of v’s violations that u doesn’t have, u has a higher-ranked violation that v doesn’t 
have. Applying the order in (7) to the ranked ordering source defined above, in which no murder 
is ranked above no jaywalking, yields the ordering on worlds in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. The ordering on worlds induced by the ranked ordering source g(w) = {¬M, ¬J} such 
that ¬J ≺w ¬M. 
According to this ordering, the best worlds are those with neither crime, followed by the jay-
walking worlds, then the murder worlds, and finally the worlds with both crimes. 
4.2. SOLVING THE EMBEDDED MEDICINE PROBLEM. I now show how the ranked ordering sources 
developed in the previous section can be used to account for the logical consistency of (6), re-
produced below as (8), even when the speaker and Kat agree on the modal base and ordering 
source propositions. 
(8) The doctor should administer medicine B, but Kat thinks they should administer A. 
In order to be more precise about the contents of the modal base and ordering source, let A and B 
denote the propositions that the doctor administers medicine A or B, respectively, let alive de-
note the proposition that the patient survives their treatment, let healthy denote the proposition 
that the patient suffers no side effects as a result of the treatment, and let responsive denote the 
proposition that the patient would respond positively to medicine A. The modal base should cap-
ture facts such as The doctor cannot administer both drugs, Medicine B will cause the patient to 
be alive but not healthy, and If the patient is not responsive to medicine A, then administering it 
will cause the patient to die. An appropriate modal base is shown in (9), and since Kat and the 
speaker of (8) agree on these facts, the modal base has this value both in the world of evaluation 
w@ and Kat’s belief worlds. 
(9) f(w) = {¬(A ∧ B), A ∨ B, B → (alive ∧ ¬healthy), (A ∧ responsive) → (alive ∧ healthy), 
    (A ∧ ¬responsive) → ¬alive} 
Just as in Katz et al.’s (2012) solution to the Medicine Problem, the ordering source should con-
tain information about what is likely. Since it is more likely than not that the patient will not 
respond well to medicine A, g(w) should contain ¬responsive. Furthermore, it should contain 
information about what is desirable, so g(w) should contain alive and healthy. Since Kat and the 
speaker agree about what is likely and what is desirable, g(w) should contain the same proposi-
tions in w@ and in Kat’s belief worlds. 
Finally, the ordering source also has a priority order ≺w on the propositions. Since the 
speaker thinks the doctor should administer B, the likelihood proposition ¬responsive should be 
prioritized over the desirability propositions alive and healthy in w@. Since Kat prioritizes desir-
ability over likelihood, the order is inverted in her belief worlds. The ranked ordering source 
evaluated at w@ and at any of Kat’s belief worlds is presented in Hasse diagram form in Figure 3. 
¬M,¬J
M,¬J
¬M,J
M, J
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Figure 3. The ranked ordering source g(w), ≺w for the EMP evaluated at the world of evaluation 
supplied by the utterance context (left) and at any of Kat’s doxastically accessible worlds (right). 
Now that the contextual parameters are fixed, the truth conditions of (8) can be computed. The 
first conjunct is true if and only if the doctor administers medicine B in all of the highest ranked 
worlds, according to the speaker, that are consistent with the modal base. Similarly, the second 
conjunct is true if and only if the doctor administers medicine A in all of the highest ranked 
worlds, according to Kat, that are consistent with the modal base. Applying the definition of ≤ in 
(7) to the ranked ordering sources in Figure 3 yields the orderings over possible worlds in Figure 
4. 
 
Figure 4. The orderings over worlds induced by the ranked ordering sources in Figure 3. The 
ordering on the left is induced by the ranked ordering source evaluated at w@, and the one on the 
right is induced by the ranked ordering source in Kat’s belief worlds. These diagrams use the 
following abbreviations: R = responsive, L = alive, H = healthy. 
Because the speaker prioritizes likelihood over desirability, the worlds in which the patient re-
sponds poorly to medicine A are ranked above those in which they respond well to it. Among the 
not-responsive worlds, the worlds in which the patient takes medicine B (and survives with side 
effects) are ranked above those in which the patient takes A (and dies) according to desirability. 
Among the less likely responsive worlds, the A worlds (in which the patient recovers fully) are 
ranked above the B worlds. Most importantly, the maximal worlds are all B worlds, so the first 
conjunct of (8) is true. 
In contrast, since Kat prioritizes desirability over likelihood, the responsive A worlds are 
ranked above all of the B worlds, which are in turn ranked above the not-responsive A worlds. 
Among the B worlds, the not-responsive worlds are ranked above the responsive worlds by like-
lihood. Since the highest ranked worlds (in all of Kat’s doxastically accessible worlds) are all A 
worlds, the second conjunct of (8) is also true, and hence the entire sentence is predicted to be 
true in accordance with intuition. In particular, because the ranked ordering source formalism 
allows the relative priority of the likelihood and desirability ordering sources to vary with the 
world of evaluation, this account does not predict that (8) is a contradiction. 
4.3. EASIER ORDERING WITH OPTIMALITY THEORY TABLEAUX. Although the definition in (7) cor-
rectly generalizes Kratzer’s (1991) ordering semantics to partially ordered ordering sources, it is 
somewhat cumbersome to work with by hand, limiting its usefulness to practicing semanticists 
who need to predict the truth values of modal sentences. Fortunately, given a mild technical as-
w@
¬responsive
alive healthy
DoxKat(w@)
¬responsive
alive healthy
B,¬R,L,¬H
A,¬R,¬L,¬H
A,R,L,H
B,R,L,¬H
A,R,L,H
B,¬R,L,¬H
B,R,L,¬H
A,¬R,¬L,¬H
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sumption,3 computing the maximal worlds under this ordering turns out to be equivalent to opti-
mizing a certain Optimality Theory tableau that is significantly easier to manipulate for those 
familiar with the formalism. 
The machinery of Optimality Theory (Prince & Smolensky 2008) is primarily used in pho-
nology and syntax and provides a framework for optimizing linguistic structures with respect to a 
set of ranked, violable grammatical constraints. My use of this formalism does not carry most of 
its theoretical commitments (e.g., the universality of the constraint set), but it exploits the fact 
that optimizing a tableau and computing the maximal worlds under the ordering in (7) are algo-
rithmically similar. Given a ranked ordering source g(w), ≺w and modal base f(w), the maximal 
worlds in the modal base can be computed by optimizing a tableau with the possible worlds in 
∩f(w) as its candidate set and the propositions in g(w) as its constraints, ranked by ≺w. A world v 
in ∩f(w) is said to violate a constraint p in g(w) if p is false at v. For example, the tableau used to 
derive the speaker’s ordering on worlds in the EMP is shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. The Optimality Theory tableau used to derive the speaker’s ordering on worlds in the 
EMP. Asterisks denote constraint violations, and the pointing hand indicates which candidate 
(possible world) is optimal with respect to the constraints (ordering source). The dashed column 
separator indicates that the alive and healthy constraints are ranked at the same level. 
Optimization in a tableau proceeds by treating each constraint in order based on its ranking. If 
some candidates violate a constraint and others do not, then those that violate that constraint are 
eliminated. This continues either until a single candidate remains or until all of the constraints 
are considered, in which case all of the remaining candidates are maximal. This optimization 
differs from standard Optimality Theory in that blocks of equally ranked constraints can occur, 
such as alive and healthy in Figure 5. These blocks are treated as a single constraint, and candi-
dates are compared on this constraint using the subset relation between their violation sets. For 
example, the first row of Figure 5 is better than the second with respect to the alive and healthy 
constraint block because the violations of the first row are a proper subset of the violations of the 
second row. 
At this point, I do not wish to imply any deeper connection between the theory of grammar 
that usually accompanies Optimality Theory and ranked ordering source semantics. Rather, Op-
timality Theory tableaux are simply a convenient notation for communicating ranked ordering 
sources and the orderings on worlds that they induce. 
5. The priority join and the structure of modality. Although the ranked ordering source solu-
tion in the previous section avoids some of the problematic predictions of Katz et al.’s (2012) 
account for the EMP, it also gives up a desirable theoretical and methodological property. Name-
ly, whereas the complex ordering source g1 * g2 is constructed from simpler ordering sources that 
are intuitively accessible from the context, the ranked ordering source that I proposed is some-
                                                
3 Namely, this is only possible if the ranked ordering source is a graded poset. Roughly, a poset is graded if its ele-
ments can be assigned to discrete “levels” or “tiers” that are consistent with the ordering. I do not yet know of any 
examples of modals that require a non-graded ranked partial order. 
World ¬responsive alive healthy
+ B,¬R,L,¬H *
A,¬R,¬L,¬H * *
A,R,L,H *
B,R,L,¬H * *
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what ad hoc. It cannot be described as just a likelihood or desirability ordering source, as it con-
tains propositions from both ideals. Furthermore, although the particular partial order ≺w I 
proposed is reasonable, many other less intuitive partial orders are possible, such as healthy ≺w 
¬responsive ≺w alive. This is theoretically undesirable because the ranked ordering source for-
malism seems to overgenerate possible truth conditions for sentences containing modals, as each 
unranked ordering source admits many possible partial orders.4 Additionally, the lack of con-
straints on ranked ordering sources creates a difficult problem for listeners: determining which of 
the many possible ranked ordering sources was intended by the speaker of a modal statement. 
In contrast, Katz et al. (2012) mitigates these problems by imposing algebraic structure on 
the space of ordering sources. In fact, one of the primary motivations for their approach is the 
observation that “there is not always a clear, direct relationship between the propositions that we 
are using to order worlds and those that we refer to when we describe the context for a modal 
utterance” (Katz et al. 2012:495). Thus, operators like * explain the relationship between intui-
tively accessible descriptions of contexts, such as those that can be paraphrased with “in view of” 
statements (e.g. “in view of what is likely”, “in view of what the law allows”), and the often 
more complex ordering sources that are actually required to capture observed linguistic data as in 
the case of the Medicine Problem. Such operators also mitigate the overgeneration problem by 
restricting attention to the subset of possible ordering sources that are derivable from a collection 
of intuitively accessible primitives, such as deontic or teleological ordering sources, and a small 
set of combinatorial operators on those primitives, such as the * operator. Finally, if listeners also 
only consider such a structured subspace of ordering sources, then this algebraic structure con-
strains theories of how listeners resolve the vagueness of modal statements. 
In order to retain these desirable properties of Katz et al.’s (2012) account, I propose a gen-
eralization of the * operator, called the priority join and denoted ⊔, that takes two ranked 
ordering sources as input and prioritizes one over the other in a world-dependent way. It also 
takes an additional parameter PRI, which is a function that takes a possible world w as input and 
returns the index (1 or 2) of the input ordering source with the higher priority in w. The precise 
definition is given in (10). 
(10) 
 
That is, given two ranked ordering sources g1, ≺1 and g2, ≺2 and function PRI, their priority join 
is a new ranked ordering source that contains all of the propositions in g1 and g2, preserves the 
partial orders ≺1 and ≺2 within g1 and g2, and ranks all of the propositions in one of the input 
ordering sources over those in the other depending on the value of PRI. For example, if PRI(w) = 
1, then all of the propositions in g1(w) are ranked above those in g2(w) in the priority join. The * 
operator of Katz et al. (2012) is equivalent to a special case of the priority join in which g1 and g2 
are unranked and PRI(w) = 1 in every world w. 
Using this operator, the ranked ordering source I used to account for the EMP in the previ-
ous section can be derived in a principled way. Let g1(w) = {¬responsive} and g2(w) = {healthy, 
                                                
4 In fact, for any ranked ordering source, there is an equivalent unranked ordering source that induces the same or-
dering on possible worlds, so strictly speaking, the ranked ordering source account does not overgenerate relative to 
the standard account. Nevertheless, if the unranked ordering sources are restricted to an intuitively accessible subset, 
such as those expressible using “in view of” phrases, the ranked ordering source account does overgenerate with 
respect to that restricted subset. 
((g1, 1) tpri (g2, 2))(w) = (g1(w) [ g2(w), 0w)
where p  0w q i↵ p  1,w q _ p  2,w q _ (p 62 gPRI(w)(w) ^ q 2 gPRI(w)(w))
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alive} be the likelihood and desirability ordering sources, respectively, where w is the utterance 
evaluation world or any of Kat’s belief worlds. In addition, let PRI(w@) = 1 in the evaluation 
world, since the speaker prioritizes likelihood, and let PRI(w) = 2 in Kat’s belief worlds, since she 
prioritizes desirability. Then the EMP ranked ordering source is g1 ⊔PRI g2. Thus, the priority join 
solves the problems raised by the EMP while retaining virtues of Katz et al.’s (2012) account by 
deriving the more complex ordering source required to capture judgments from simpler, intui-
tively accessible ordering sources. 
6. Conclusion and future work. In this paper, I have presented the Embedded Medicine Prob-
lem, which suggests that ordering source priorities are not just fixed at the level of the utterance 
and can be manipulated by intensional operators such as attitude verbs. I have introduced ranked 
ordering sources, which allow ordering source propositions to have varying degrees of im-
portance in determining an ordering on possible worlds, and I have shown how the world-
dependent priority afforded by the ranked ordering source account avoids the problems that the 
Embedded Medicine Problem raises for Katz et al.’s (2012) account of ordering source priority. 
Finally, in the spirit of the proposal by Katz et al. (2012) that complex ordering sources required 
to account for data should be explicitly related to the simpler and intuitively accessible ordering 
sources that semanticists use to characterize discourse context, I have proposed the priority join 
operator, which combines two ranked ordering sources using a world-dependent priority relation. 
If ranked ordering sources correctly model how contextually supplied priorities affect modal 
interpretation, then one would expect evidence of this additional structure in different domains of 
modality. I will speculate on a few such domains here, though the details remain to be devel-
oped. Firstly, one of the chief motivations for Katz et al.’s (2012) project of developing ordering 
source operators was to understand the semantics of gradable modal expressions (GMEs), or 
modal expressions that can occur in comparative constructions and with degree modification. In 
some cases, I suspect, the degree scale manipulated by these constructions may be derived in part 
from the partial order on the ranked ordering source. For example, the truth of the comparative 
statement in (11) is arguably related to the relative priority of the propositions ¬murder and 
¬jaywalk in the ordering source used to interpret the modal adjective worse. 
(11) It is worse to commit murder than to jaywalk. 
Another potential application of ranked ordering sources comes from Rubinstein’s (2012) ac-
count of weak necessity modals. Rubinstein (2012) makes a distinction between two different 
kinds of ordering source: primary ordering sources, whose propositions are collectively commit-
ted to as desirable by all conversational participants, and secondary ordering sources, which are 
not committed to as desirable by at least one participant. The difference between strong necessity 
modals like have to and weak necessity modals like ought to is that strong necessity modals are 
interpreted only with respect to the primary ordering sources, and weak necessity modals are also 
interpreted with respect to some secondary ordering source. Furthermore, when interpreting 
weak necessity modals, the domain of possible worlds is first restricted by the primary ordering 
sources before optimizing with respect to the secondary ordering source. This is functionally 
equivalent to assigning the secondary ordering source a lower priority, in the sense of ranked 
ordering source priority, than the primary ordering sources. If the distinction between primary 
and secondary ordering sources is best modeled using ranked ordering sources, then one should 
expect that an ordering source’s primary or secondary status may be shifted by intentional opera-
tors. Thus, examples of weak necessity models that are (or aren’t) contextually licensed in a 
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matrix clause but aren’t (or are) licensed in the scope of some intentional operator would be ad-
ditional converging evidence in favor of ranked ordering sources. 
Yet another semantic formalism that may bear on ranked ordering sources comes from Vil-
lalta’s (2008) account of predicates that license the subjunctive mood in Spanish. According to 
Villalta (2008), the semantic commonality between subjunctive-licensing predicates is that they 
involve comparing the proposition denoted by their complement clause to a set of alternative 
propositions along some scale, such as desirability or likelihood. In particular, the ordering on 
the set of alternative propositions is derived from a primitive ordering on worlds. If <x,w is the 
desirability ordering on worlds for an entity x in world w—that is, u <x,w v if and only if v is a 
more desirable world to x in w than u—then an ordering <DESx,w on propositions is defined as in 
(12). 
(12) p ≤DESx,w q iff for all u such that p(u), there exists v such that q(v) and u <x,w v 
Interestingly, the relationship between <DESx,w and <x,w is very similar to that between the par-
tial order ≺w on a ranked ordering source and the ordering on possible worlds in induces. In fact, 
if an ordering on propositions ≺ induces an ordering < on possible worlds as a ranked ordering 
source, and ≺DES is an ordering on propositions derived from < using (12), then ≺	=	≺DES. Thus, 
Villalta’s (2008) construction is a left inverse of the function that maps ranked ordering sources 
to induced orderings on possible worlds. It is an open question whether the partial orders of 
primitive ranked ordering sources, such as likelihood and desirability, can all be so derived from 
the world orderings implicated in the semantics of subjunctive-licensing predicates. In addition, 
Villalta (2008) proposes a degree semantics for subjunctive predicates that derives from the or-
dering <DESx,w on alternative propositions. It remains to be seen whether the same degree scale 
constructed from ranked ordering sources can give a satisfactory account of GME’s such as the 
one in (11). 
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